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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-2835 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DOUGLAS CANTEY, 
               Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. No. 09-cr-504) 
District Judge:  Hon. Susan D. Wigenton  
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 28, 2012 
 
Before:   SLOVITER, CHAGARES, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  June 29, 2012) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 While on supervised release for committing wire fraud, Douglas Cantey was 
arrested and charged with credit card fraud and violating the terms of his supervised 
release.  Cantey pled guilty to those charges in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey and was sentenced to time served for the credit card fraud and 24 
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months’ imprisonment for the violation of his supervised release.  He appeals, arguing 
that there were procedural errors in the sentencing, that the sentence was substantively 
unreasonable, and that the District Court denied his right to allocution.  Because the 
sentence imposed was procedurally and substantively reasonable and because Cantey was 
not denied the right to allocute, we will affirm.  
I. Background 
Cantey’s criminal activity dates back to the early Nineties when he was convicted 
of credit card-related crimes nine times.  In 2004, continuing his criminal conduct, 
Cantey engaged in a scheme whereby he and his co-conspirators made unauthorized wire 
transfers through Western Union in order to steal more than $400,000.  Cantey was 
arrested and pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 
371 and 1343 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.  
In April 2006, he was sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised 
release.   
After his term of imprisonment ended in December 2008, Cantey’s supervised 
release was transferred to the District of New Jersey and he promptly returned to his 
criminal activities.  From January 2009 until his arrest in June 2009, Cantey fraudulently 
opened lines of credit using the identifying information of deceased or elderly victims,  
and he used those fraudulently-opened accounts to purchase various items.   
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Cantey was arrested in June 2009 and charged with one count of unauthorized 
access of a device with the intent to defraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2),1
Before his sentencing hearing in June 2011, Cantey offered to provide information 
to the government about Abdul Williams, a fellow inmate who was awaiting trial on a 
firearms charge.  According to Cantey, Williams had conspired with attorney Clifford 
Minor and another individual, Jamal Muhammad, for Muhammad to falsely confess to 
Williams’s firearms charge.  Cantey’s cooperation in revealing that scheme led to the 
arrest of all three individuals and they later pled guilty to witness bribery charges.   
 and with violating  
his supervised release.  Cantey pled guilty to both counts in February 2010 in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey.   
At his sentencing hearing, the Court began by noting that it had considered the 
government’s motion for a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1,2
                                              
1 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2), (c) provides that “[w]hoever … knowingly and with 
intent to defraud traffics in or uses one or more unauthorized access devices during any 
one-year period, and by such conduct obtains anything of value aggregating $1,000 or 
more during that period … shall, if the offense affects interstate or foreign commerce, be 
punished … [with] a fine … or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both … .” 
 the 
defendant’s submission requesting a sentence of time served for both counts, and a 
personal letter from Cantey to the Court.  The Court heard from Cantey’s attorney, who 
urged the Court to give “a sentence of time served both for the substantive offense and 
for the violation sentence for [Cantey’s] probation violation … .”  (App. at 59a.)  The 
2 U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 provides that “[u]pon motion of the government stating that the 
defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of 
another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.”   
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defense cited Cantey’s cooperation, his personal history, his prospects for rehabilitation, 
and his gambling addiction and medical condition3
Following the defense’s arguments, the Court asked Cantey if he would like to say 
anything.  Cantey said “[w]ell, first I just want to apologize,” but he was, for some 
reason, unable to finish his comments.  (App. at 64a.)  The government stated that it did 
not object to the defense’s proposed sentence, noting that, in its view, “a time served 
sentence would [not be] unreasonable.”  (App. at 65a.)  The Court then returned to 
Cantey, who said “I first want to apologize for being here and to any of the victims who 
were compromised [by] my actions.  And I just pray that your Honor’s merciful.”  (App. 
at 65a.)  
 as the bases for its request.   
The Court then considered various factors before sentencing Cantey.  The Court 
took into consideration the government’s § 5K1.1 motion.  In considering the factors 
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the Court recognized its objective in crafting a 
sentence that “would be sufficient but not greater than necessary to reflect the 
seriousness” of Cantey’s crimes.  (App. at 67a.)  The Court noted Cantey’s long criminal 
history and that he had essentially committed the same crimes of identity theft and credit 
card fraud many times since 1991.  The Court also noted that Cantey was out of prison 
for only a month before resuming his criminal activity.  In considering Cantey’s 
gambling addiction, the Court stated that it was unsure to what extent that alleged 
addiction played a role in his crimes.  With respect to the unauthorized access conviction, 
                                              
3 During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel referred to a then-undiagnosed 
skin condition afflicting Cantey.  
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the Court granted the government’s motion for a downward departure, reducing Cantey’s 
offense level from 15 to 10 because of his cooperation, and sentenced him to time served 
based on his time in prison since June 2009.   
The Court then sentenced Cantey to 24 months’ imprisonment for the supervised 
release violation.  In crafting the sentence for that violation, the Court did not believe that 
time served was appropriate given Cantey’s extensive criminal history and his return to 
criminal activity only a month after being released from prison.  The Court stated that 
while it had considered the defendant’s cooperation, it was not sufficient to erase his 
misconduct and, in particular, his rapid return to crime.  After imposing the sentence, the 
Court allowed the defense to again articulate the reasons why a time-served sentence was 
appropriate for the supervised release violation.  The defense emphasized Cantey’s 
cooperation, but the Court responded that it had considered the issue and found his 
sentence to be appropriate even in light of that cooperation.  Cantey filed this timely 
appeal.  
II. Discussion4
Cantey argues on appeal that the sentence imposed was procedurally and 
substantively unreasonable.  He also argues that the District Court denied his right to 
allocution.  Both sets of argument are based on the premise that the sentencing hearings 
for the unauthorized access charge and the violation of supervised release were separate.   
 
                                              
4 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We review the 
procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed by the District Court 
for abuse of discretion.   United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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Cantey is fundamentally wrong, however, in viewing the sentencing hearing for 
the two convictions as being two distinct hearings.  The Court held a single sentencing 
hearing for both the substantive offense and supervised release violation.  The factual 
circumstances leading to those charges are the same.  The defense opened its arguments 
at the sentencing hearing by making a request for time served on both counts and 
provided arguments to support that position (App. at 59a (asking the Court to sentence 
Cantey to “time served both for the substantive offense and for the [supervised release] 
violation”)), and concluded its remarks by again making a request for time served on both 
counts.  Because the unauthorized access charge and the sentencing violation involved 
the same conduct, the Court’s analysis throughout the sentencing hearing was applicable 
to both charges.   
Turning to the procedural reasonableness question, § 3553(a) provides for a 
number of factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, including the nature and 
circumstances of the offense, the characteristics of the defendant including his criminal 
history, the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense and to deter 
future criminal conduct, the kinds of sentences available and the sentencing guidelines, 
the need to avoid unwarranted disparities between sentences for similar crimes, and the 
need to provide restitution to any victims.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  While a district court 
must give “meaningful consideration to the [§ 3553(a)] factors,” United States v. Grier, 
475 F.3d 556, 1569 (3d Cir. 2007), there was no procedural error here because the Court 
offered a thoughtful analysis of those factors during the sentencing hearing.   
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Cantey argues that the District Court did not consider a mitigating personal 
characteristic – his gambling addiction – in sentencing him, but the Court did consider 
that issue.  (App. at 67a (“Now, I know you say that this is all as a result of a gambling 
addiction.  I don’t know if it is or it isn’t.  There’s some part of the presentence report 
that said that that was just something that you were feigning to receive some type of 
consideration for some prior offense.”).)  Cantey also argues that the Court did not 
consider that he had already served over two years in jail at the time of sentencing, but 
again, the Court noted the time that he had already served.  (App. at 70a (“I do recognize 
that you have been incarcerate[d] for a period of time.”).)  Finally, Cantey argues that the 
District Court did not consider his substantial cooperation and the risk of retaliation he 
faced as a result, but the District Court considered Cantey’s cooperation in crafting the 
sentence.  (App. at 74a (“While I certainly have taken into consideration your 
cooperation, I am of the opinion that the consecutive aspect of this violation is necessary 
because of the factual background, quite honestly.  I mean you were released in 
December and started this offense to which you entered a plea of guilty in January.”); 
App. at 66a (“[T]here was obviously a risk of safety involved as well, and potential 
danger to Mr. Cantey for cooperating, given the nature of the cooperation, given the 
nature of the individuals involved, given the nature of the offenses as well that were 
involved.”).)   
We also reject Cantey’s contention that the sentence imposed by the District Court 
was substantively unreasonable.  “Our substantive review requires us not to focus on one 
or two factors, but on the totality of the circumstances. … [and] the party challenging the 
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sentence has the burden of demonstrating unreasonableness.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567.   
Our inquiry in reviewing substantive reasonableness boils down to this:  
… absent any significant procedural error, we must give due deference to 
the district court’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, 
justify the sentence.  In other words, if the district court’s sentence is 
procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court 
would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the 
reasons the district court provided. 
 
Id. at 568 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
Here we believe that, as discussed above, the District Court thoughtfully 
considered the § 3553(a) factors.  The Court offered a persuasive rationale for imposing a 
24-month sentence, focusing on Cantey’s extensive criminal history and his rapid return 
to criminal activity following his release from prison.5
Finally, Cantey argues that he was denied the right of allocution.  We disagree.  
Prior to sentencing, a defendant has the right to make a statement to the Court and to 
present any information in mitigation of the sentence.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4) (“Before 
imposing sentence, the court must ... address the defendant personally in order to permit 
  Such facts provide a sound basis 
for the District Court’s sentence.  The Court considered defense counsel’s arguments and 
even entertained additional defense argument asking for reconsideration of the sentence 
after it was announced.  The Court assessed those additional arguments and again reached 
the same conclusion.  The Court’s carefully measured sentence was, in short, 
substantively reasonable.   
                                              
5 Further, the sentence was in accord with the statutory maximum of 24 months’ 
imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), and was within the guidelines range of 21 to 27 
months’ imprisonment, U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). 
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the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence.”); see United 
States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he right of allocution [is] an 
important safeguard that should be strictly enforced according to its terms.”).  That right 
extends to hearings involving the revocation of supervised release.  United States v. 
Plotts, 359 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2004)  (“We conclude that a criminal defendant’s right 
of allocution extends to release revocation hearings.”).  Here, Cantey was offered an 
opportunity to address the Court, not once but twice, though the first was truncated.  
Cantey’s argument again stems from the misconception that the Court held two separate 
sentencing hearings for the same conduct.  Cantey made no subsequent request to address 
the Court following his first two allocutions that day but rather complains that he was not 
invited to allocute a third time.  He had his say, however, and the District Court did not 
deny him the opportunity to allocute.   
III. Conclusion 
For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court.  
